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When people can unilaterally influence the outcomes of an interaction, they are in a position of 2 
power or, in other words, they have leverage over others. Leverage can be achieved in different 3 
ways. People can use physical force to punish others so that they conform to their will 4 
(Marquart, 1986) and they can also use third-parties as social alternatives to end previously 5 
disadvantageous interactions (Barclay, 2013). The access to alternatives such as different social 6 
partners, contracts or rewards, just like the possession of unique resources, can be a source of 7 
leverage because it creates asymmetries between interacting individuals. For example, an 8 
individual in possession of a unique resource could ask for higher prices than other suppliers 9 
because her goods or services are better than those of her competitors.  10 
While the example mentioned above applies mainly to human adult interactions in which some 11 
basic economic understanding is required, social transactions of this nature also occur during 12 
childhood (e.g. children bargaining over collectable items such as trading cards). Recent studies 13 
have investigated the strategies that young children use to resolve conflicts of interest at the 14 
dyadic (Grueneisen & Tomasello, 2017; Sánchez-Amaro, Duguid, Call, & Tomasello, 2017, 2019) 15 
and the group level (Grueneisen & Tomasello, 2019).  However, little is known about whether 16 
children, who have minimal experience in market transactions, would use alternative options as 17 
leverage in social dilemmas.  18 
Several studies have documented the development of children’s abilities to coordinate towards 19 
mutual goals as well as to resolve conflicts of interest. After their second birthday children are 20 
already capable of actively coordinating their actions with peers to reach common goals 21 
(Brownell, Ramani, & Zerwas, 2006) and to solve simple problems cooperatively (Ashley & 22 
Tomasello, 1998). Later, between three and five years of age, children begin to demonstrate 23 
normative aspects of their collaborative activities, feeling committed to joint goals with their 24 
peers (Hamann, Warneken, Greenberg, & Tomasello, 2011). At the same age, children are 25 
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capable of solving collaborative tasks by considering the different roles that partners must adopt 26 
to solve a joint task (Fletcher, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2012) and to plan division of labour in 27 
collaborative tasks (Warneken, 2018; Warneken, Steinwender, Hamann, & Tomasello, 2014). 28 
From a very young age they also coordinate their decisions to collaborate in efficient ways 29 
(Wyman, Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2013) and by the age of four years old, they are capable of 30 
forgoing a less preferred but secure reward to obtain a mutually preferred one (Duguid, Wyman, 31 
Bullinger, Herfurth-Majstorovic, & Tomasello, 2014).  32 
When conflicts of interest arise, five-year old children develop strategies to resolve them. A 33 
conflict of interest occurs when there is no mutually beneficial solution, that is, children have 34 
different preferences for the outcome of an interaction. Several recent studies have focused on 35 
how children manage conflicts of interest in situations with the following structure:  A pair of 36 
children are presented with an unequal reward distribution. The rewards are accessible for a 37 
limited amount of time and the high value reward is only accessible to the child that waits for 38 
her partner to act first. The conflict of interest arises because their preferences are not aligned: 39 
each child prefers the partner to act before them while the rewards are still accessible. Children 40 
have demonstrated the ability to establish cooperative strategies to overcome these conflicts of 41 
interest by  taking  turns to divide the rewards equally, even when this means that they receive 42 
no rewards on some turns, and communicate appropriately to coordinate their decisions 43 
(Grueneisen & Tomasello, 2017; Melis, Grocke, Kalbitz, & Tomasello, 2016; Sánchez-Amaro, 44 
Duguid, Call, & Tomasello, 2019). A turn-taking strategy is most efficient when the interaction is 45 
predictable, e.g. repeated interactions with the same amounts of resources and it is easy for 46 
participants to keep track of previous interactions. When the distribution of rewards is 47 
unpredictable five-year-old children abandon cooperative strategies such as turn-taking in 48 
favour of competitive strategies to maximize their rewards (e.g. waiting for a partner to act 49 
before them when that results in better rewards for the passive individual; Sánchez-Amaro et 50 
al., 2017). Finally, around the same age, children are able to maintain depletable resources by 51 
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generating their own rules and strategies such as distracting one another to prevent the collapse 52 
of a common pool resource (Koomen & Herrmann, 2018).  53 
Common to all of these situations is that children face a social dilemma and they must decide 54 
between acting cooperatively or selfishly (Dawes, 1980). On the one hand acting selfishly (e.g. 55 
waiting for the partner to act) is more beneficial than cooperating (e.g. acting before the 56 
partner). On the other hand, pairs can avoid the worst outcome (being the recipient of a selfish 57 
act) if they both cooperate and thus still obtain some rewards. In all these social dilemmas the 58 
interaction is always symmetrical. That is, despite children’s goals not being aligned, both 59 
partners have the same options available to them and are thus likely to share the same 60 
strategies. However, little is known about the strategies that children would use to overcome 61 
conflicts of interest when their interaction is asymmetrical. For example, when only one child 62 
can access a secure alternative and thus can avoid participating in the social dilemma. That is, 63 
when one child is in a position of leverage.  64 
Understanding how leverage (in the form of alternative options) can affect the decisions we 65 
make in social dilemmas has been experimentally studied in adult humans. In a study by 66 
Binmore, Shared, & Sutton (1989) adult participants were asked to divide $7 between 67 
themselves and an anonymous recipient. The recipient could accept the offer or reject it for 68 
both the participants. Participants also knew that the recipient had the option to exit the 69 
negotiation and obtain a $4 alternative on his own.  Under these conditions, participants offered 70 
recipients more than half the total amount (i.e. $4.50 instead of $3.50 each). This way 71 
participants ensured that recipients would accept their offer, avoiding a complete loss of the 72 
rewards. Evidence that adults understand others’ positions of influence and adjust their 73 
decisions accordingly also comes from coordination games such as the Battle of Sexes (Cooper, 74 
DeJong, Forsythe, & Ross, 1994; Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, & Ross, 1990). In an example of this 75 
two-player coordination game, two players (Player A and Player B) had the option to choose 600 76 
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lottery tickets for themselves and 200 for the other or vice versa. However, if both players chose 77 
the 600 tickets for themselves, they would get no tickets. In addition, only Player A had the 78 
opportunity to opt out and obtain a secure reward of 300 tickets for each player. The 79 
experimenters found that players in position A chose the option that would provide them with 80 
the highest reward (600 tickets for themselves and 200 for the partner) on a majority of trials. 81 
In turn, players in position B anticipated this decision and chose 200 tickets for themselves. In 82 
other words, Player A influenced Player B’s decision through the use of leverage. In these 83 
studies, adult participants played against anonymous partners and could not communicate.  84 
Previous methods involving monetary rewards are hard to implement with young children. 85 
Instead, when testing children’s strategies in social dilemmas it is preferable to present them 86 
with engaging scenarios in which they can interact and communicate as they would do in real 87 
life situations. Our study explores whether children can use a position of leverage when their 88 
personal preferences are not aligned. We build on a previous experiment (Sánchez-Amaro et al., 89 
2017) in which five-year-old children were presented with a dyadic anti-coordination game, the 90 
Snowdrift (Sugden, 2004). In this game, each child would prefer their partner to be the one to 91 
cooperate (by pulling a rope) because cooperation provides more rewards for the child who 92 
waits (does not pull the rope). However, if both children wait for each other (i.e. mutual 93 
defection), they lose the opportunity to obtain any rewards. To implement this social dilemma, 94 
we presented children with an unequal reward distribution on two ends of a rotating tray. The 95 
rewards were placed at both ends but only the one end could be accessed directly by pulling a 96 
rope (henceforth the rope end), with the other end (the free end) moving towards the partner.  97 
In the critical condition, the preferred reward was placed on the free end of the tray so that the 98 
child could only obtain it by waiting for the partner to pull her rope. However, if both children 99 
waited too long for their partner to act, all rewards were lost. We found that children behaved 100 
strategically by pulling later when the preferred reward was not directly accessible to them.  This 101 
task deviates from more traditional implementations of social dilemmas in that children were 102 
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able to communicate, their decisions were inter-dependent (the actions of one child already 103 
determined what both children could obtain), they had limited time to act, and they were also 104 
familiar with each other (in the same class).  105 
In the current study, we presented pairs of seven-year-old children with the same basic task: 106 
both individuals could either obtain one marble baited on the rope-end of the tray as reward 107 
when they pulled from their rope, or three marbles on the free end if they waited for their 108 
partner to pull. This created a conflict of interest, as both individuals would prefer their partner 109 
to pull before them. The difference with the previous study (Sánchez-Amaro et al., 2017) was 110 
that we added the possibility of using leverage. In this task one of the children could access an 111 
alternative, secure and exclusive reward (zero, two or four rewards, depending on the condition) 112 
in addition to the unequal reward distribution on the rotating tray accessible to both children. 113 
Henceforth, we call the child in possession of the alternative the subject and the child without 114 
an alternative the partner. The addition of potential leverage in the form of alternatives further 115 
differentiates our task from typical social dilemmas by creating asymmetries in the potential 116 
strategies for partners. 117 
Subjects faced three conditions determined by the amount of rewards baited on the alternative. 118 
When there was no secure alternative (zero rewards; see Figure 1, scenario 1), both children 119 
had symmetrical options—they could only access the rotating tray- and thus there was no 120 
leverage. This re-created the snowdrift game presented to children in the previous study 121 
(Sánchez-Amaro et al., 2017). When the alternative consisted of two rewards (Figure 1, scenario 122 
2), subjects could use it as leverage, operationalized as the possibility to access the alternative 123 
option instead of the rotating tray. This alternative is a greater reward than that for cooperation 124 
in the social dilemma, but less than they receive if the partner cooperated. Finally, when the 125 
alternative consisted of four secure rewards (Figure 1, scenario 3), subjects should always prefer 126 
the four rewards instead of accessing the rotating tray which either offered one or three 127 
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rewards. An important aspect of the game is that choices between the rotating tray and the 128 
alternative are irreversible. Subjects only maintain their leverage while they have both options 129 
available, i.e. until they have made a decision.  Thus, subjects should wait for their partners to 130 
pull for one reward before acting, otherwise they would lose the advantage conferred by their 131 
leverage. At the same time, partners should be more likely to pull for one reward before all 132 
rewards were removed given that subjects could easily access two rewards.  133 
The introduction of the leverage in the form of an alternative option adds complexity to our 134 
previous task. In this scenario, children need to understand that their strategies might differ 135 
depending on the leverage level presented to the subject. In addition, depending on the 136 
situation children might need to inhibit their access to the secure alternative. In the previous 137 
study with the same rotating tray, we tested five-year olds (Sánchez-Amaro et al., 2017) but 138 
given the potential increase in complexity and task demands we decided to test a sample of 139 
older children (seven-year-olds) first.  140 
In line with previous studies, we expected children to demonstrate strategies that successfully 141 
avoid mutual defection in the social dilemma, i.e. children waiting for each other until the 142 
experimenter removed the rewards (Sánchez-Amaro et al., 2017, 2019). We also expected 143 
children to be able to track the relative rewards available in each condition. Thus, we expect 144 
that the higher the value of the alternative the more likely they would be to forego the access 145 
to the rotating tray in favour of the alternative option. Importantly, we expected the seven-year-146 
old children to understand the potential function of their leverage position. This is demonstrated 147 
by two measures (see also Figure 1 for a summary of the main predictions). Firstly, when the 148 
alternative consisted of two secure rewards, we expected subjects to wait for their partner to 149 
pull first. Secondly, we expected decrease in time waiting (both when acting as subject and as 150 
partner) with an increase in the value of the alternative option. For example, when the 151 
alternative consisted of four rewards (more than the reward available in the rotating tray) we 152 
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expected children to access it directly and not wait for the other child. With regard to how 153 
children use communication, we expected children in both positions (as subject and as partner) 154 
to communicate in a similar manner when no child had leverage over the other. In contrast, 155 
when subjects had leverage over partners, we expected the latter to communicate more often: 156 
since subjects who hold the privileged position, partners need to persuade them to negotiate a 157 
better deal. Finally, we evaluated whether children would behave differently between sessions 158 












Figure 1: Representation of main hypothesis for subjects’ and partners choices across the three 171 
different leverage levels (scenarios 1-3). If the rope is pulled by the subject the tray spins anti-172 
clockwise and one reward becomes accessible to the subject, three to the partner and vice versa 173 
if the partner pulls the rope and the tray spins clockwise. 174 
Subject Partner Rotating tray 
access the rotating tray 
after partner 
access the rotating tray 
after subject 
access the rotating tray 
after partner 
access the rotating 
because subject has 
leverage 















Material and methods  175 
Subjects 176 
We tested 20 pairs of 7 years and 0 months old to 7 years and 11 months old children (10 pairs 177 
of boys and 10 pairs of girls; Mage= 7y-5M-20D, SD= 4M) in German schools within the Leipzig 178 
city area. All participants were recruited from a database of children whose parents had 179 
provided written consent to take part in child development and comparative studies. Pairs were 180 
made up of children from the same school.  181 
Apparatus 182 
Pairs of children were presented with a rotating wooden tray positioned on top of a wooden 183 
platform, encased in a transparent plastic case (see Figure 2). In two of the corners of the case, 184 
on opposite sides, were transparent compartments approximately 3 cm x 3 cm (henceforth 185 
referred to as alternative platforms). Children faced each other across the box and had access 186 
to the rotating tray and one of the alternative platforms. A transparent lid covered the surface 187 
of the box from the top to prevent children from accessing the rewards. On each side of the 188 
apparatus, transparent plastic doors blocked the openings to the rotating tray and to the 189 
alternative platform. Children could slide the door to the right to access the ropes connected to 190 
the roped (low value) end of the rotating tray. To access the free (high value) end of the rotating 191 
tray children had to wait for their partner to pull (Figure 2b). The alternative platform could be 192 
accessed directly by sliding the door to the left (Figure 2d). When a child slid the door to either 193 
side, a locking mechanism prevented the door from returning to its original position—this way 194 





Figure 2: Representation of the apparatus. The subject is on the left side and has access to two 198 
rewards on the alternative (figures a and b) or four rewards on the alternative (figures c and d). 199 
In figure b the subject access the unequal distribution while in figure d the subject access the 200 
alternative.  201 
Design and procedure 202 
Before the test sessions, each child participated in three training phases. 203 
Training phase 1 204 
In the first training phase, pairs of children learned how to access the rewards from the rotating 205 
tray. After a period of warm-up in which an experimenter (henceforth E1) interacted with the 206 
children, E1 introduced children to the apparatus and to the second experimenter (henceforth 207 
E2). Children were told that E2 did not speak German; this way we minimized interactions 208 
between children and E2. This method has been successfully used on previous studies employing 209 
a similar methodology (Sánchez-Amaro et al., 2017; Sánchez-Amaro, Duguid, Call, & Tomasello, 210 
2018a). Children were asked to sit at opposite sides of the apparatus to play a game—children 211 
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would change their sides after every training phase and test session. E1 told the children that 212 
the aim of the game was to obtain the maximum number of marbles from the wooden box and 213 
that E2 would control some parts of the apparatus (i.e. the blocking pegs and the positioning of 214 
the ropes). While E1 was referring to the rewards that children could get, E2 showed children a 215 
handful of small black wooden marbles. E1 told children that they could place their collected 216 
marbles inside the boxes beside them—these boxes were already prepared before the children 217 
came in.  After that, E1 showed each child how to access the rotating tray by sliding the door to 218 
their right. Next, E2 baited the rotating tray with three marbles on the free end and one marble 219 
on the roped end of the tray. Each child performed one trial in which only the acting child had 220 
access to the roped end of the tray (i.e.  the child pulling the rope obtained the rewards from 221 
that end while the other child obtained the rewards from the free end). After these two trials, 222 
children performed another two trials in which both of them had simultaneous access to their 223 
ropes and could decide which of them would pull. In all four trials the experimenters waited for 224 
children to make their decisions. If children hesitated to act, E1 encouraged them to pull from 225 
their ropes and collect the marbles. Once they finished the fourth trial, E1 informed children 226 
that they had obtained lots of marbles and that, in order to continue playing, one child should 227 
leave the room and wait for his or her turn. 228 
Training phase 2 229 
In the second training phase each child learned individually how to obtain rewards from the 230 
alternative platform and how to choose between the two options (alternative platform or 231 
rotating tray) to maximize the number of rewards. At the beginning of the second training phase 232 
E1 showed the child how to access their alternative platform by sliding the door to their left). E1 233 
repeated to every child that they should try to obtain as many marbles as possible. In this 234 
training phase children were also allowed to retrieve the marbles from their partner’s side, who 235 
was waiting outside the room. A child faced two types of trials differing in the number of rewards 236 
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baited on the rotating tray and the alternative options. In one type of trial, the child found one 237 
marble on each end of the rotating tray and four marbles on the child’s alternative platform. To 238 
succeed, the child had to access the alternative platform. In the second type of trial, the child 239 
was presented with two marbles on each end of the rotating tray and two marbles on the child’s 240 
alternative platform. In these trials, the child had to access both ends of the rotating tray.  241 
Each child was presented with a minimum of four trials separated in two blocks. In the first block, 242 
a child experienced each type of trial once. If they failed to maximize the rewards on these two 243 
trials, they were allowed to try again until they obtained the best outcomes. Eleven children 244 
needed to repeat the first trial and one child needed to repeat the second trial (the maximum 245 
number of extra trials for a child were two). This allowed children to learn the contingencies of 246 
each type of trial. In the second block, each child experienced every type of trial once regardless 247 
of the result. Seven children fail one trial in the second block (5 children repeated the first trial 248 
and 2 children repeated the second trial). 249 
Training Phase 3 250 
In the third training phase the children played together again and experienced a no-conflict 251 
situation where they could either access one reward from each side of the rotating tray or from 252 
the alternative platform.  E1 told children that they were ready to play together once again 253 
because they had had already learned the functions of the apparatus. This phase had four trials: 254 
two trials with one marble baited on each end of the rotating tray and two trials with one marble 255 
baited on each alternative platform. The presentation order of the trials was randomized. During 256 
this training phase, children did not receive help while making their decisions, but they were 257 
told the reason why they failed when that occurred. In three pairs, one child failed one trial. 258 
Test sessions 259 
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After the third training phase, E1 told children that they were going to play the real game for 260 
better rewards. Concurrently, E2 showed children a handful of coloured glass marbles, the new 261 
type of rewards they were going to collect.  262 
Afterwards, E1 invited children to follow her to another side of the room. E1 presented each 263 
child with a laminated paper sheet. Each paper sheet contained a spiral made up of 40 264 
connected dots. Every five dots there was star-shaped. The size of the stars increased towards 265 
the centre of the spiral. E1 told children that they should collect as many marbles as possible 266 
and place each marble on a spiral dot—starting from the outer dots and filling them towards the 267 
centre. For each star they filled, they would obtain a surprise at the end of the game. The spirals 268 
were created in a way that it was impossible for any child to reach the last star (i.e. there were 269 
more dots than glass marbles). While children were informed how to use the laminated sheet, 270 
E2 removed the boxes containing the wooden marbles that children had obtained during their 271 
training. After children got their laminated sheets, they returned to their positions in front of 272 
the box. At that moment, E1 told them that she had to leave the room. Once they were alone 273 
with E2, the first session began.  274 
Each pair of children participated in two test sessions. For the first session, children were 275 
randomly assigned the role of subject or partner. They changed roles between sessions—half of 276 
children played as subject in session one and the other half as subject in session two. Pairs of 277 
children performed six trials per session for a total of twelve trials. At the end of the first session 278 
E1 came in and told children to change their sides before they continued with the game. 279 
Afterwards, E1 left the room again and children completed their second test session. 280 
Both children had access to the rewards baited on both ends of the rotating tray. However, only 281 
subjects could get rewards baited on their alternative platform. During test trials, the roped end 282 
of the rotating tray contained one glass marble while the free end contained three. The subjects’ 283 
alternative platform could contain zero, two or four marbles (henceforth leverage levels zero, 284 
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two and four). Each leverage level was presented twice within a session and the trial 285 
presentation order was randomized within sessions.  Thus, children experienced the same 286 
amount of trials per leverage condition (two trials) on each session (except for one pair in which 287 
the leverage level two was presented three times and the leverage level four was presented only 288 
once due to an error). For half of the pairs the subjects’ alternative was always located on the 289 
right platform, and for the other half it was located on the left platform.  290 
The test trial started when the experimenter simultaneously removed both pegs blocking the 291 
sliding doors. A trial lasted from the moment the experimenter removed the pegs until both 292 
children accessed the apparatus and obtained the rewards, or 15 seconds if one or both children 293 
did not act. After that time, the experimenter removed all the remaining rewards and ended the 294 
trial. Following previous methods (Sánchez-Amaro et al., 2017, 2019), we did not inform children 295 
about the time they had to access the rewards. 296 
Coding 297 
We investigated whether children used strategies to maximise their rewards; specifically, 298 
whether they used their position of leverage strategically (i.e. whether subjects obtain the three 299 
rewards more often than partners and whether subjects wait for partners to act; see Table 1). 300 
We were also interested in whether the conflict of interest would lead to a complete breakdown 301 
of coordination and some children would receive no rewards. To do this we focused on their 302 
actions and verbal communication during test trials. 303 
We coded three aspects of the participants’ actions:  rewards distribution, choices made and 304 
their timing (latencies). We calculated the percentage of trials in which both children obtained 305 
rewards, only one child obtained rewards and when both children failed to obtain anything. We 306 
also recorded their choices. Within a trial, children had four different options: 1) access the 307 
rotating tray and pull, 2) access the rotating tray and wait, 3) access the alternative platform or 308 
4) take no action. In addition to their choices, we took two latency measures: 1) from the time 309 
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E2 removed the blocking pegs (trial starts) until children either opened their access to the 310 
rotating tray or to their alternative platform and 2) from the time they access the rotating tray 311 
until they pulled their rope. We scored the same latency measure for subjects and partners using 312 
specialized video-coding software (Mangold Interact GmbH). 313 
To code the verbal communication, we adapted a previous coding scheme used to study 314 
children’s communication in a similar conflict of interest (see Sánchez-Amaro et al., 2019). As a 315 
first step we transcribed all verbal communication and pointing gestures that occurred from the 316 
moment E2 showed the rewards to the children (just before the rewards were baited on the 317 
box) until E2 showed the rewards to the children in a subsequent trial, or after E2 stood up to 318 
indicate the end of the session. We divided trials in two-time phases: from when E2 showed the 319 
rewards until the last child emptied the box (trial phase) and from the moment both children 320 
emptied the box until the next trial started (inter-trial-interval). As a second step communicative 321 
acts were assigned to categories that could indicate how children were solving the conflict of 322 
interest: 323 
i) Informative communication: acts aimed at informing child’s current or impending 324 
actions or intentions (e.g. “I am going to pull”).  325 
ii) Imperative communication: use of deontic verbs to guide others decisions (e.g. “you 326 
must pull”).  327 
iii) Protests: statements of disapproval or objection about another child’s actions or 328 
intentions (e.g. “no, I also wanted”).  329 
iv) From the subjects’ perspective we coded if children referred to their own leverage 330 
as part of their arguments (henceforth reference to leverage: e.g. “I am going to wait 331 
because I have this [indicating the leverage]” or “now I will access here [the 332 
leverage]”). From the partners’ perspective we also coded their references to the 333 
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subjects’ leverage (e.g. “you should pull here [as opposed to accessing the leverage] 334 
this time”).  335 
v) We coded whether children used arguments to refer to future or past actions 336 
(henceforth turn-taking communication:  e.g. “next time you pull” or “next time it is 337 
my turn because..”). These types of arguments are expected if children engage in 338 
turn-taking strategies for cooperation.  339 
vi) All other communicative acts were assigned to the category other (e.g. 340 
onomatopoeic sounds, unclear utterances). 341 
For each child (either as subject or as partner) and each trial phase we coded whether they 342 
communicated or not in any of the ways described above. Thus, multiple categories could occur 343 
for each child within a trial phase. In total, each communicative act could appear four times 344 
within a trial.  345 
In addition to verbal communication, we recorded points to three different locations: 1) the 346 
rotating tray, 2) the alternative platform (i.e. the leverage) and 3) other task-related points (i.e. 347 
pointing at the reward sheet, at the experimenter or at the other child).  348 
Statistical analysis 349 
All the analyses were run using R statistics (version 3.1.1). Generalized linear mixed models were 350 
used to investigate children choices (to either access the alternative platform or the rotating 351 
tray; Model 1) and communicative acts (whether leverage level, included as a 3-level factor, and 352 
trial phase influenced subjects’ and partners’ communicative acts (Model 4) (Baayen, Davidson, 353 
& Bates, 2008). To implement these models we used the “lme4” package (Bates, 2010). To 354 
obtain the P values for the individual fixed effects we conducted likelihood-ratio tests. We 355 
assessed the stability of these models by comparing the estimates derived from models based 356 
on all data with those obtained from models with the levels of the random effects excluded one 357 
at a time. The models were stable.  358 
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Mixed-effects Cox proportional hazard models (Models 2 and 3) were used to analyse subjects 359 
and partners latencies to act. For this purpose we used the “coxme” function from the “coxme” 360 
package (Therneau, 2012). This approach allows to analyse the variability attributable to the 361 
independent variables while controlling for right-censored data (i.e. when children did not act 362 
after the 15 seconds limit established by the experimenter). The results of the coxme models 363 
are reported as hazard ratios (HR). An HR greater than one indicates an increased hazard of 364 
acting (either opening the door in model 2, or pulling the rope in model 3) while an HR smaller 365 
than 1 indicated a decreased hazard of acting. In addition, we conducted likelihood-ratio tests 366 
to obtain the P values for the individual fixed effects.  367 
To rule out collinearity we checked the variance inflation factors (VIF) for the GLMM and the 368 
coxme models. All VIF values were closer to 1.  369 
Reliability 370 
Choices and latencies 371 
The inter-observer reliability based on 20% of the data was excellent. Cohen Kappa’s were 372 
calculated to assess the reliability of children’s choices from the left and the right side of the 373 
apparatus. Pearson R2 were calculated to assess the reliability of latencies to open the doors and 374 
pull the ropes from both side of the apparatus. When children sat on the right side: latency to 375 
open the door (Cohen Kappa = 1, Pearson R2 = 0.99) and latency to pull from the rope (Cohen 376 
Kappa = 1, Pearson R2 = 0.99). When children sat on the left side: latency to open the door (Cohen 377 
Kappa = 0.96 (2% of data mismatch between observers), Pearson R2 = 0.97) and latency to pull 378 
from the rope (Cohen Kappa = 0.96 (2% of data mismatch between observers), Pearson R2 = 379 




Based on 20% of the data, the inter-observer reliability was excellent. Cohen Kappa’s were 382 
calculated to assess the reliability of communication coding and whether observers interpreted 383 
those communicative acts as informative acts of communication or not: occurrence of 384 
communication (Cohen Kappa = 1) and occurrence of informative acts (Cohen Kappa = 0.75). We 385 
only looked at informative acts of communication because we could analyse their impact 386 
separately. Informative acts of communication accounted for 57% of communication (each act 387 
appearing a maximum of four times per trial).  388 
Results 389 
Both children obtained rewards in a majority of trials (87.1%, 209 of the 240 trials), only one 390 
child obtained rewards in 5.8% of trials (14 of the 240 trials) and no children obtained rewards 391 
in 7.1% of trials (17 of the 240 trials). We found that subjects tried to maximize their rewards. 392 
This is reflected in their increasing likelihood to choose the alternative option with increasing 393 
reward value (GLMM:  2   = 74.35, df = 3, p<0.001, N = 240; Figure 3). When subjects had no 394 
alternative option, they accessed the rotating tray in most trials (90%, 72 of the 80 trials; only 6 395 
children ever accessed the alternative). In contrast, when their alternative option consisted of 396 
four rewards—and thus the best outcome available—they accessed the rotating tray in only 5% 397 
of trials (4 of the 79 trials, 39 children accessed the alternative at least once). Interestingly, 398 
subjects chose to access the rotating tray in 42% of trials (34 of the 81 trials) when their leverage 399 
consisted of two marbles (28 children accessed the alternative at least once), significantly more 400 
often than when their leverage consisted of four marbles (GLMM:  2   = 68.42, df = 2, p<0.001, N 401 
= 240; see Table 1). In other words, in a substantial amount of trials children were willing to 402 
refuse two secure rewards to access the ropes connected to the rotating tray. In addition, we 403 
found that children who participated as subjects in the second session (after being partners) 404 
were less willing to access the rotating tray (in 40% of trials, 48 of the 120 trials) rather than the 405 
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alternative platform compared to children who participated as subjects in the first session (in 406 
51.6% of trials, 62 of the 120 trials) (GLMM:  2   = 6.43, df = 1, p= 0.01, N = 240). 407 
 408 
Figure 3: Proportion of social choices as a function of the level of leverage. The box-plots 409 
represent the median (thick line) and interquartile range of the proportion of times that each 410 
subject accessed the social choice (i.e. the unequal reward distribution). The dotted line 411 
represents the model fitted values. 412 
To use the leverage effectively, children in the role of subjects should access the rotating tray 413 
after partners had already pulled from their ropes. Once both individuals only had access to their 414 
ropes, they were in an equal position to obtain the best reward. Of the trials in which subjects 415 
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chose the social option rather than two secure rewards (42% of trials, 34 of the 81 trials), they 416 
made the most of their leverage, by waiting for the partner to pull before they access the social 417 
option, in 38% of those trials (13 of the 34 trials). In other words, subjects used their leverage 418 
strategically in 16% of the total trials (13 of the 81 trials).  Subjects were able to maximize their 419 
rewards (i.e. obtain the three rewards from the free end of the rotating tray; see Table 1). 420 
Table 1: Number and percentage of trials in which subjects access the alternative, subjects pull 421 
first and partners pull first. Also shown is the percentage of trials in which partners pulled before 422 
the subjects acted and the percentage of trials in which both refused to pull after or before 423 
accessing the rotating tray.  Notice that the percentage of trials in which the partner pulls before 424 
the subject acts is only relevant when the leverage level is 2, and is a subset of trials in which 425 
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 427 
When we inspected the latencies to act (for the subject this was open the sliding door and 428 
choosing one option; for the partner this was  pulling the rope connected to the rotating tray), 429 
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we found that both subject (coxme,  2   = 26.59, df = 2, p <0.001, N = 240; Figure S1) and partner 430 
(coxme,  2   = 8.84, df = 2, p =0.012, N = 240; Figure S2) latencies were affected by the subjects’ 431 
leverage.  Pairwise comparisons indicated that subjects waited to act a similar amount of time 432 
when they had no leverage and when their leverage consisted of two glass marbles (coxme, HR 433 
= 1.16, p =0.41, N = 240). That is, when they could not access the best rewards on their own, 434 
children in the role of subjects waited longer for their partners to act. In contrast, when subjects 435 
could access four glass marbles on the alternative platform, they acted significantly faster 436 
compared to when they had two (coxme, HR = 2.15, p <0.001, N = 240) or no alternative rewards 437 
(coxme, HR = 2.49, p <0.001, N = 240). Children in the role of partner also waited to act a similar 438 
amount of time when both children had no leverage and when the subject could access two 439 
alternative rewards (coxme, HR = 0.94, p =0.84, N = 240). Children in the role of partner also 440 
acted significantly faster when the subject could access four instead of two glass marbles from 441 
her alternative platform (coxme, HR = 0.32, p = 0.0161, N = 240).  This is especially interesting 442 
from the partners’ perspective as it suggests that children did not need to have the leverage 443 
themselves to understand its role during the interaction. In other words, children in the role of 444 
partner inferred what subjects would choose based on the subjects’ leverage position before 445 
subjects had made a decision. We found no significant differences in latencies (either as subject 446 
or as partner) between sessions, so changes in partner role did not seem to have an effect (see 447 
ESM). 448 
Children did not communicate more often during the dilemma phase than during the inter-trial-449 
interval phases regardless of their role and or the leverage presented on the subject’s alternative 450 
platform (GLMM:  2   = 6.43, df = 6, p = 0.37, N = 240; see Table S1).  Additionally, we found no 451 
statistical differences in children informative acts of communication between trial phases, role 452 
and or condition presented (GLMM:  2   = 4.84, df = 6, p = 0.56, N = 240). Other categories of 453 
communication such as imperatives, protest, references to leverage and turn-taking occurred 454 
very rarely and thus we could not test whether they were influenced by trial phase, children 455 
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roles and leverage levels. Partners generally protested more than subjects (see Table S4). This 456 
might be explained by the fact that subjects obtained more rewards than partners in a majority 457 
of trials.  458 
We found that children pointed in a minority of trials (17%; N = 40). In total, children performed 459 
47 pointing gestures. Children in the subject role pointed slightly more often than children in 460 
the partner role (subjects producing 61% of points). Points towards the leverage accounted for 461 
33% of trials while pointing gestures towards the rotating tray accounted for 24% of trials. 462 
However, a majority of pointing gestures (42%) were categorized as general pointing acts. 463 
Interestingly, 73% of communicative acts (16 of 22) containing references to the alternative 464 
option—the source of leverage—occurred in conjunction with pointing acts towards the rotating 465 
tray or/and the leverage.  466 
Discussion 467 
When presented with an asymmetrical social dilemma, we found some evidence that seven-468 
year-old children used access to alternative rewards as leverage to maximize their own benefits. 469 
We expected that children would use their leverage strategically by waiting for their partners to 470 
act before them. We found that in over 15% of trials children initially in the position of leverage 471 
maintained it by waiting to make their decisions until their partners had already decided to pull 472 
for the lower reward. We also expected children to wait less with increasing amounts in the 473 
alternative. We found that children in the role of subject did wait less when the alternative 474 
contained four rewards but they did not differentiate between two or zero rewards on the 475 
alternative, presumably because in both cases they could maximise their own rewards by 476 
waiting for the partner, regardless of leverage. Similarly, children in the role of partner also 477 
waited less when the subjects had an alternative of four rewards as compared to zero or two 478 
rewards, but did not differentiate between two or zero rewards. It is conceivable that when 479 
subjects had zero or two rewards on the alternative, partners still had a chance to maximize 480 
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their own rewards by waiting. This is especially interesting from the partners’ perspective 481 
because it suggests that children could anticipate the effect of alternative options on the actions 482 
of others.  483 
In addition, we found that children playing the subject role accessed the alternative more often 484 
(regardless of the leverage level presented) in the second session (i.e. when they already had 485 
experience as a partner). However, the children’s decisions were not entirely consistent with a 486 
thorough understanding of their leverage position. They still often accessed either their 487 
alternative option or the rotating tray before their partner had made a decision. In addition, we 488 
found that children rarely referred to the leverage. Perhaps this is due to the asymmetric nature 489 
of the interaction.  They may have found little room for negotiation when their potential options 490 
were unequal. However, in those cases in which children verbally referred to the alternative 491 
option, they accompanied their utterances with pointing gestures towards the apparatus, most 492 
likely as a way to emphasize the source of leverage to their partner.  In addition, we did observe 493 
that children in the role of partner (the disadvantaged position) generally protested more than 494 
their counterparts. In what follows, we discuss a number of possible reasons that could explain 495 
these results. 496 
A simple account of our results could be that the task was too cognitively demanding for children 497 
to be able to use their leverage efficiently. They did not understand that, depending on the 498 
available alternatives, they could obtain more rewards by waiting for their partners to act. We 499 
find this explanation implausible as children passed several training phases before they entered 500 
the test phase, demonstrating that they understood the required actions to maximize rewards. 501 
In addition, the latencies to access the rewards as well as the pattern of decisions suggest that 502 
they partially understood the conflict of interest presented in the game. Moreover, previous 503 
studies using the same rotating tray suggested that five-year-old children understood a simpler 504 
version of the social dilemma (Sánchez-Amaro et al., 2017). 505 
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Given that they did understand the reward structure of the game, it is possible that children did 506 
not understand the social dilemma, but saw it as a non-social economic game. In this case we 507 
would expect children to choose the highest value reward they could access. Children in the 508 
subject role were equally likely to choose two rewards from the alternative option or the 509 
rotating tray (which would provide one reward if they pulled alone). From an economic 510 
perspective, this result makes sense as both options would lead to an average of two rewards 511 
over repeated trials. However, the timing of the children’s actions, in this study as well as 512 
previous studies presenting children with similar social dilemmas (Sánchez-Amaro et al., 2017, 513 
2019), are inconsistent with a non-social interpretation of their decision making. In addition, 514 
children were more likely to exploit the alternative option after having played as partner first, 515 
perhaps in an attempt to restore inequity between participants since partners usually got less 516 
rewards. Although, it is also possible that children playing as subjects in the second session 517 
already had more experienced and thus tried to maximize their rewards more often by accessing 518 
the alternative. Therefore, we suggest that children took into account the presence of the other 519 
child and her potential decisions, thus, interpreting the game as a social dilemma in which 520 
personal decisions directly affected each other’s outcomes. 521 
Nonetheless, children are clearly not using the position of leverage consistently or to its full 522 
potential. We suggest two potential drivers of their decisions. The first is that seven-year-olds 523 
may be willing to take the risk (i.e. choose the rotating tray instead of the two secure rewards) 524 
to get the higher reward, regardless of their strategic advantage with the leverage.  Previous 525 
studies suggest that young children tend to be more risk-prone than adults in a number of 526 
different scenarios (Boyer, 2006; Harbaugh, Krause, & Vesterlund, 2002; Paulsen, Platt, Huettel, 527 
& Brannon, 2011). This is in line with our finding from the current study that children accessed 528 
the rotating tray, the risky option, in almost half of the trials when they had two as an alternative 529 
option (i.e. they had leverage). However, these studies usually present children with non-social 530 
gambling situations whereas, in our study the risk was a social one (e.g. the partner could also 531 
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decide to wait for them to pull). Adults are found to be more risk averse in social than non-social 532 
contexts (Bohnet & Zeckhauser, 2004) so we would need further studies to test this hypothesis 533 
with children.   534 
A second explanation for the failure to use leverage is that children were trying to establish 535 
cooperative solutions to the unequal reward distribution and thereby restore equity between 536 
players (Warneken, 2018). From early on in ontogeny, children are willing to distribute the 537 
benefits generated through collaboration (Ulber, Hamann, & Tomasello, 2015; Warneken, 538 
Lohse, Melis, & Tomasello, 2011). One common way to distribute rewards over time is to engage 539 
in turn-taking, a strategy that children and adult humans use in a variety of social dilemmas to 540 
stabilize cooperation (Grueneisen & Tomasello, 2017; Helbing, Schönhof, Stark, & Hołyst, 2005; 541 
Melis et al., 2016; Sánchez-Amaro et al., 2019).  In our task children did occasionally encourage 542 
their partners to engage in turn-taking strategies. However, a turn-taking strategy in this 543 
scenario would have been challenging due to the asymmetrical and variable options children 544 
faced across trials (see also Sánchez-Amaro et al., 2017). Instead, children may have found 545 
alternative strategies to reduce inequity between subject and partner payoffs. For example, 546 
when subjects had no leverage (their alternative option was empty) they pulled so their partner 547 
received the higher reward in the majority of trials (67%). This is also the condition in which we 548 
see the most protest from partners and could be one way of compensating for conditions when 549 
the subject usually gains more rewards. Consistent with the notion of restoring equity, we found 550 
that children acting as subjects second (in session two) were more likely to exploit the leverage, 551 
perhaps as a strategy to obtain more resources than they had obtained as partners. Studies 552 
suggest that an aversion towards disadvantageous inequality starts to develop early in ontogeny 553 
(LoBue, Nishida, Chiong, DeLoache, & Haidt, 2011; McAuliffe, Blake, Kim, Wrangham, & 554 
Warneken, 2013) followed by an aversion towards advantageous inequity around age 7-8 (Blake 555 
et al., 2015; Blake & McAuliffe, 2011). Furthermore, it is possible that some children let others 556 
obtain the best rewards to prevent reputational damage since both children were from the same 557 
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school (Engelmann, Over, Herrmann, & Tomasello, 2013; Fujii, Takagishi, Koizumi, & Okada, 558 
2015). Future studies could then assess whether the degree of familiarity plays a major role in 559 
children decision-making strategies in social dilemmas.  560 
Conclusions 561 
These results advance our understanding of how children overcome conflicts of interest with 562 
peers by introducing a leverage component in a social dilemma. In that sense, this study deviates 563 
from previous work showing how younger children coordinate actions when the potential 564 
outcomes are symmetric and thus easier to predict (Grueneisen & Tomasello, 2017; Melis et al., 565 
2016). However, the current study was a demanding task for seven-year-old as illustrated by 566 
their resulting actions. For the future, the introduction of leverage in different ways may help us 567 
to understand children decision-making in these types of social conflicts from an earlier age. For 568 
example, qualitative instead of quantitative differences between rewards may reduce the 569 
computational load due to the number of items presented on a given trial. Furthermore, as 570 
mentioned earlier, leverage can be instantiated in diverse ways including access to alternative 571 
partners (e.g. a child that can access one game others cannot). In this regard, it would be 572 
interesting to explore how children would make use of social leverage when alternatives are 573 
social partners with distinct qualities and characteristics.  574 
The current task also required children to wait for their partner to act before them to maximize 575 
their chances of obtaining the best rewards. Thus, children with greater delayed gratification 576 
skills would have had an advantage. Previous work has assessed the relationship between 577 
executive inhibitory control and cooperative behaviour (Ciairano, Visu-Petra, & Settanni, 2007; 578 
Giannotta, Burk, & Ciairano, 2011). Children with higher degree of inhibitory control were better 579 
co-operators in a puzzle task. Future studies could investigate the relationships between 580 
inhibitory control and decision-making in the context of social dilemmas. Finally, the resolution 581 
of social conflicts through the use of coordination games is tightly linked with the use of Theory 582 
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of Mind abilities to predict and anticipate others’ actions (Hedden & Zhang, 2002). We did not 583 
assess the role of Theory of Mind abilities in our task, children could observe and respond to the 584 
actions of their partner and were also free to communicate about future actions. Evidence from 585 
studies preventing children from communicating with each other has shown that after their sixth 586 
birthday, they are able to form first and second-order false-belief reasoning to coordinate 587 
actions when their interests are aligned (Grueneisen, Wyman, & Tomasello, 2015; Raijmakers, 588 
Mandell, van Es, & Counihan, 2014). Applying similar methods to coordination games with 589 
leverage could offer novel ways to explore the role of ToM abilities on coordination over conflict 590 
situations.  591 
In sum, we found that by seven years of age, children seem to understand the potential role 592 
that individual alternatives play in a social dilemma, but they do not fully use it to their own 593 
advantage. Our findings could be the result of a trade-off between maximizing rewards, while 594 
maintaining long-term collaboration in complex scenarios where strategies such as turn-taking 595 
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Electronic Supplementary Materials 722 
Model 1: Subjects’ choices 723 
Model 1 investigated whether subjects would strategically use the leverage for their own 724 
benefit. We hypothesize that if subjects would understand the potential use of the leverage 725 
baited on the alternative platform, we would find a leverage effect in the direction of subjects 726 
accessing more often their leverage the bigger it was. The full model included the test variable 727 
leverage level (3-level factor) l and the control variables trial, session (which also accounts for 728 
role order) and sex of the pair as fixed effects; pair, individual on the right side and individual on 729 
the left side as random effects and the random slopes. The comparison between the full and the 730 
null model was significant (GLMM:  2   = 74.36, df = 3, p<0.001, N = 240). We found a main effect 731 
of leverage (see Table S1). Children accessed their leverage most of times when that consisted 732 
of four rewards, and almost never when no leverage was available. 733 
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the model 
Intercept  -2.79 0.56 - - - -27.24, 1.35 
Leverage 
(lev. 2) 
3.14 0.57 68.42 2 <0.001 1.77, 31.39 
Leverage 
(lev. 4) 
6.26 0.79 68.42 2 <0.001 4.6, 58.53 
Session 0.57 0.23 6.43 1 0.01 -0.08, 6.09 
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 735 
Model 2. Subjects latency to access the apparatus. 736 
Model 2 investigated subjects’ latencies to access the apparatus. We hypothesized that, if 737 
subjects would understand the potential use of the leverage baited on the alternative platform, 738 
they would wait longer to access the apparatus when the alternative platform consisted of zero 739 
or two glass marbles instead of four. For this model we established a censor to account for trials 740 
in which subjects did not open the door after 15 seconds and for trials in which partners pulled 741 
from their rope before subjects acted. The censored data represented 17% of the total data (40 742 
of 240 trials). The model included the test variable level of leverage and the control variables 743 
trial, session (which also accounts for role order) and sex of the pair as fixed effect. Individual 744 
identity was introduced as a random effect. The leverage level was significant (coxme,  2   = 26.59, 745 
df = 2, p <0.001, N = 240). Subjects waited longer to open the sliding door the smaller the 746 
leverage was (see Table S2). 747 
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Session 0.08 0.19 1.09 0.66 -0.39, 0.41 
Trial 0.08 0.04 1.09 0.054 0.04, 0.08 
 749 
Figure S1: Subjects’ latency to access the apparatus as a function of the leverage level presented 750 
to the subject. The higher the level of leverage the faster the subject accessed the apparatus. 751 
The horizontal lines represent the average latencies. The blank dots represent the censored 752 
data: trials in which subjects did not open the access after 15 seconds and trials in which partners 753 
pulled their rope before subjects acted.  754 
 755 
 756 
Model 3. Partners’ latency to pull from the rotating tray. 757 
Model 3 investigated partners’ latencies to pull from their rotating tray. We hypothesized that, 758 
if partners would understand the role of subjects’ leverage, they would tend to pull faster the 759 
larger the subjects’ leverage was—as the subjects would likely access its own alternative when 760 
this one consisted of four glass marbles. For this model we established a censor to account for 761 
trials in which the partner did not open the door after 15 seconds and for trials in which either 762 
35 
 
the subject opened their access to the leverage before the partners had pulled, or the subjects 763 
pulled before the partners. In other words, when partners had no chances to freely decide 764 
whether to pull or wait for subjects to act. The censored data represented 77% of the total data 765 
(185 of 240 trials). The model included the test variable level of leverage and the control 766 
variables trial, session (which also accounts for role order) and sex of the pair as fixed effect. 767 
Individual identity was introduced as random effect. The level of leverage was significant 768 
(coxme,  2   = 8.84, df = 2, p = 0.010, N = 240).  Partners waited longer to open the sliding door 769 
the smaller the leverage of the subject was (see Table S3). In other words, partners waited longer 770 
to act when both had similar chances to obtain the highest reward baited on the free end of the 771 
rotating tray. 772 









CI of model 
estimates 
Leverage (lev. 2) -0.06 0.29 0.94 0.84 -0.65,0.69 
Leverage (lev. 4) -1.2 0.47 0.3 0.01 -0.61, 0.72 
Dyad_sex (male) -0.58 0.37 0.56 0.12 -0.74, 0.73 
Session -0.51 0.37 0.6 0.17 -0.69, 0.71   
Trial 0.12 0.08 1.12 0.16 0.13, 0.2 
 774 
Figure S2: Partners’ latency to access the apparatus as a function of the leverage level presented 775 
to the subject. The higher the level of leverage the faster the partner accessed the apparatus. 776 
The horizontal lines represent the average latencies. The blank dots represents’ the censored 777 
data: trials in which partners did not open the access after 15 seconds and trials in which subjects 778 





Model 4. Communication 782 
Model 4 investigated the occurrence of communication. In this model we included all trials. We 783 
transformed our response into a binomial response where 1 meant the presence of any 784 
communicative act for subjects and partners and 0 no presence of communication within a trial. 785 
The full model included the communicator ID (subject or partner), the leverage phase and the 786 
trial phase (trial and inter-trial-intervals) as well as the two-way interaction between 787 
communicator ID and leverage phase. We expected children to communicate more during 788 
interacting phases. In addition, we expected partners without leverage to communicate more 789 
than subjects when the latter had access to alternative rewards. The control variables were trial, 790 
session and sex of the dyad as fixed effects; pair and trial ID as random effects and all possible 791 
random slopes. The comparison between the full and the null model excluding all test variables 792 
was not significant (GLMM:  2   = 5.73, df = 6, p = 0.45, N = 960). In addition, we tested a model 793 
only including informative communicative acts (the most represented form of communication). 794 
The comparison between the full and the null model excluding test variables was not significant 795 




Table S4. Number of times each communicative type occurred per leverage level, child role and 798 
trial phase (maximum value per cell = 80). 799 
  
Phase 1 














Informative 37 32 32 35 34 35 
Imperative 22 7 1 16 5 6 
Protest 10 7 5 14 12 6 
Leverage 4 2 1 2 1 1 
Turn taking 8 5 1 6 4 2 
Others 22 26 19 24 20 15 
  Phase 2 














Informative 37 39 39 43 35 39 
Imperative 3 1 1 3 1 0 
Protest 5 1 0 3 4 7 
Leverage 1 5 1 1 1 2 
Turn taking 3 1 0 1 2 1 
Others 14 15 18 14 16 9 
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